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Abstract
This study analyzes collusion in an enterprize in which concerns about hedging cannot be
ignored. In our two-agent single-task hidden-action model, where all the parties involved have
exponential utility functions and the principal owning normally distributed observable and
verifiable returns is restricted to offer linear contracts, agents may exploit all feasible collusion
opportunities via enforceable side contracts. Hence in general, an optimal incentive compatible
and individually rational contract is not necessarily immune to collusion.
We demonstrate that collusion may be ignored when making the agents work with the
highest effort profile is profitable for the principal and either of the following holds: (1) mean
of the return is only affected by the first agent’s effort level, whereas variance of that is only
affected by the second agent’s, (2) mean is increasing and variance is decreasing separately
in effort levels of both of them. On the other hand, for situations in which any of these
assumptions are violated, numerical examples, showing that collusion may make the principal
strictly worse off, are provided.
For the justification of linear contracts as was done in the model of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) we consider a variant of its generalization given by Sung (1995), into which collusion
possibilities are incorporated. In that continuous-time repeated agency problem including
collusion, we prove the optimality of linear contracts.
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1 Introduction
A standard principal-agent problem1 has individual rationality and incentive compatibility con-
straints, which ensure that (1) none of the agents get a lower expected utility than provided by
their outside employment opportunities and (2) none of the agents has a higher expected utility by
deviating alone and choosing an effort level other than the one desired by the principal. However,
when agents can observe each other’s effort level, tacit collusion which might arise due to repeated
interaction may be analyzed in a one-shot moral hazard model in which the agents are allowed
to write binding side contracts.2 In such a setting these standard constraints are not necessarily
sufficient to eliminate collusion opportunities, hence, collusion cannot be ignored.
We study a two-agent single-task hidden-action framework with collusion where all parties in-
volved dislike risk. Thus, including the non-wealth-constrained principal, all parties involved are
risk averse and in particular have exponential, i.e. constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), utility
functions, a common assumption made in contract and finance theory in order to eliminate income
effects.3 The distribution of returns from the project depends on and is normal for any given effort
profile agents choose. Although we work with the general model where each agent separately may
control the mean and the variance, an interesting case happens when the effort choice of the first
agent, the product manager, has more impact increasing the mean, and that of the second, the
finance manager, more impact decreasing the variance of the return process. In order to restrict
the principal to consider linear state-contingent compensation schemes, our work employs the sig-
nificant results and techniques of Sung (1995) which generalizes Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to
the case where not only the mean but also variance of output can be controlled independently of
each other.
In this model the interaction between incentive compatibility and collusion proofness is analyzed.
We establish that collusion may be ignored when arranging the agents work with the highest effort
profile is optimal for the principal and either of the following holds: (1) mean of the return is
affected only by the effort level of the first agent, whereas variance only by that of the second, (2)
1Early theoretical work in a single-agent moral hazard model includes Wilson (1969), Spence and Zeckhauser
(1971), Ross (1973), Mirlees (1974), Mirlees (1976), Harris and Raviv (1979), Shavell (1979), Holmstrom (1979),
Grossman and Hart (1983), Rogerson (1985), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991),
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), Schattler and Sung (1993), Sung (1995), Schattler and Sung (1997), and Hellwig
and Schmidt (2002) among others. Models with many agents, on the other hand, have been studied by Baiman and
Demski (1980), Lazaer and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom (1982), Demski and Sappington (1984), Mookherjee (1984),
Demski, Sappington, and Spiller (1988), Ma, Moore, and Turnbull (1988), Itoh (1991) and many others.
2In the absence of repeated interaction, we think of a situation where a principal employs two agents each of
whom can observe the other’s effort level, and engage in enforceable side contracts. A particular franchising example
would be a manufacturing firm delegating its sales to a dealer network (agent 1) while using a financial auditing
company (agent 2) to manage its accounts.
3Indeed, we think of the principal and agents to be hedgers as modelled in the finance literature.
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mean is increasing and variance is decreasing separately in effort levels of both of them. On the
other hand, for situations in which these assumptions are violated, by providing numerical examples
we demonstrate that collusion could make the principal strictly worse off.
The significance of collusion in hidden-action models was first observed by Demski and Sapping-
ton (1984), Demski, Sappington, and Spiller (1988), and Mookherjee (1984). In their hidden-action
framework they modelled the interaction between the agents with a non-cooperative game and iden-
tified multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria that are not payoff equivalent for the principal. Ma, Moore,
and Turnbull (1988) eliminated the undesirable equilibria from the point of view of the principal,
by using a mechanism where an agent acts as a designated “police” under the promise of extra
utility, never getting realized in equilibrium. Because that the success of their mechanism critically
depends on single agent deviation due to the use of non-cooperative game theoretic tools, Barlo
(2003) proposed to analyze the interaction among the agents through cooperative game theoretic
means. When agents can observe and verify each others effort choices and have the opportunity
to write binding side contracts, he shows that collusion proofness can be replaced by the following:
principal’s offer, an effort profile and a state-contingent compensation scheme, must be in the core
of the bargaining game it induces among the agents.4 For more we refer the reader to third chapter
of Barlo (2003).
The use of linear contracts obtained from normally distributed returns and exponential utility
functions has been a key ingredient in applied contract theory literature also incorporating multiple
tasks into the analysis. We cite Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Lafontaine (1992), Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1994), and Slade (1996) to that regard. The pioneer work in establishing theoretical
justifications for such models (and also resolving the non-existence result due to Mirlees (1974))
is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which was generalized by Sung (1995). In those studies they
present repeated agency settings in which the lack of income effects due to exponential utility
functions were employed to show the optimality of linear contracts. An immediate implication of
this kind of linearity results is that instead of considering a complicated repeated setting, it is as if
the situation were to be that the agent were to choose the mean of a normal distribution only once,
and the principal were restricted to employ linear sharing rules.
In order to reach a similar conclusion, we generalize the repeated agency model provided by
Sung (1995) to incorporate potential collusion between two agents. Proving the optimality of linear
contracts, thus, enables us to conclude that the linearity restriction might be defended in the same
fashion as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
In section 2 we present and discuss the ingredients of our model and section 3 demonstrates our
main result characterizing the cases in which collusion may or may not be ignored. Finally, in section
4The principal only knows that agents are rational, but is not aware of the particular relative bargaining power
each agent possesses. Thus, the principal’s only knowledge about the bargaining process is that it has to produce a
Pareto optimal and participatory result.
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4 we present a continuous-time repeated agency model with collusion for which the optimality of
linear contracts is proved.
2 Model
Ours is a two-agent single-task hidden-action model with state-contingent, observable and verifiable
returns. The principal possessing an asset has to employ two agents, and is not wealth-constrained.
If operated, this asset delivers state-contingent observable and verifiable returns drawn from a
normal distribution whose mean and variance is determined by employees’ effort choices. The
principal cannot observe or verify their effort levels, hence, contracts he may offer cannot depend
on agents’ effort profile. However, each agent observes the other’s effort choice and by writing
binding state-contingent side contracts they can exploit all collusion opportunities.
We assume that E, the set of effort levels, is finite. Asset’s state-contingent returns x ∈ < are
distributed with F (x | e), such that for all e = (e1, e2) ∈ E2, F (x | e) is the normal cumulative
distribution given by the mean µ(e) and the variance σ2(e). We define the highest effort profile, as
an effort profile e ∈ E2 where µ(e) > µ(e′) and σ2(e) 6 σ2(e′) for all e′ 6= e.
The principal and agents are all risk-averse, and have exponential utility functions with the
following coefficients of risk aversion: R for the principal, and ri for agent i = 1, 2. Agent i has
a utility function ui(y, ei) = − exp{−ri(y − ci(ei))}, where costs of effort are in terms of return.
Additionally, each agent has an outside employment opportunity resulting in reserve certainty
equivalent of Wi, i = 1, 2. Given a wage contract (Si(x))i=1,2,x∈< which makes both agents accept
and exert the effort level e ∈ E2, expected utilities for the principal and agent i, are:
Eup(S1, S2 | e) =
∫
− exp{−R(x− S¯x)}dF (x | e)
Eui(Si | ei, e−i) =
∫
− exp{−ri(Si(x)− ci(ei))}dF (x | ei, e−i),
where S¯x = S1(x) + S2(x).
We restrict attention to linear contracts of the form
Si(x) = γix+ ρi, (1)
where γi, ρi ∈ <, i = 1, 2. Thus, we can use standard techniques of determining the certainty
equivalent from an exponential utility and a normal distribution, and obtain the certainty equivalent
of agent i = 1, 2 when e ∈ E2 is exerted as follows:
CEi(γi, ρi | e) = γiµ(e) + ρi − ri
2
γ2i σ
2(e)− ci(ei).
Similarly, the certainty equivalent of the principal is:
CEp(γ, ρ | e) =
(
1−
2∑
i=1
γi
)
µ(e)− R
2
(
1−
2∑
i=1
γi
)2
σ2(e)−
2∑
i=1
ρi.
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In this setting, the individual rationality constraint for agent i = 1, 2, who has a given reserve
certainty equivalent of Wi is:
γiµ(e) + ρi − riγ
2
i
2
σ2x(e)− ci(ei) > Wi. (IRi)
Similarly, the incentive compatibility constraint for agent i = 1, 2 is:
γi (µ(e)− µ(e′i, e−i))−
riγ
2
i
2
(
σ2x(e)− σ2(e′i, e−i)
)
> ci(ei)− ci(e′i), ∀e′i. (ICi)
So far the model described is basically the two-agent single-task version of the one given by
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
2.1 Collusion
Collusion proofness constraint as introduced by Laffont and Martimort (1997) in a hidden-information
model, has been formulated for two-agent hidden-action models by Barlo (2003). The requirement
is that the principal is restricted to offer contracts that none of the agents can strictly benefit upon
by deviating jointly to a feasible side contract and effort profile. Barlo (2003) deals with this con-
straint by formulating the interaction among agents with a bargaining game where the principal’s
offer, a compensation scheme and effort profile, is given. Agents jointly try to extract all the surplus
due to more efficient risk sharing and coordination in effort choices, by considering feasible joint
deviations5 with the use of binding side contracts. Moreover, the bargaining power of agents should
not be observable by the principal. Then, Barlo (2003) proves the existence of an optimal collusion
proof, incentive compatible and individually rational contract whenever existence of an optimal
incentive compatible and individually rational solution is given. He also shows that for interior
solutions6, collusion proofness constraint can be replaced by another set of constraints which make
(1) the principal take care of all the joint deviations in effort profiles, and (2) offer contracts under
which the two agents’ marginal rate of substitution between two states is equal to one another.
Hence the first set of collusion constraints we will impose (for agent i) is as follows:
γi (µ(e1, e2)− µ(e′1, e′2))−
riγ
2
i
2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e′1, e′2)
)
> ci(ei)− ci(e′i), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2. (CCi)
Moreover, in order to establishing the requirement that two agents’ marginal rate of substitution
between two states must be equal to one another it enough to have
γ1
γ2
=
r2
r1
. (CC ′)
due to the specific form of the exponential utility functions (lack of income effects) and linear wages
as given in equation 1.
5These deviations are required to satisfy a participation constraint, i.e. cannot make any of the agents strictly
worse off than the expected utility level they would get from the principal’s offer.
6Conditions on the utility functions that guarantee the optimal contract be interior are the same as given in
assumption A1 of Grossman and Hart (1983).
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2.2 The Principal’s Problem
Under the requirement of linear compensation schemes as defined in equation 1, we are now ready
to present the principal’s problem P1 including collusion proofness constraints:7
max
(γi,ρi,ei)i=1,2
{(
1− r1 + r2
r2
γ1
)
µ(e)− R
2
(
1− r1 + r2
r2
γ1
)2
σ2(e)−
2∑
i=1
ρi
}
, (P1)
subject to
(IR1) : γ1µ(e) + ρ1 − r1γ
2
1
2
σ2(e)− c1(e1) > W1, (2)
(IR2) :
r1
r2
γ1µ(e) + ρ2 − r
2
1γ
2
1
2r2
σ2(e)− c2(e2) > W2, (3)
(CC1) : γ1 (µ(e1, e2)− µ(e′1, e′2))−
r1γ
2
1
2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e′1, e′2)
)
> (4)
c1(e1)− c1(e′1), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2,
(CC2) :
r1γ1
r2
(µ(e1, e2)− µ(e′1, e′2))−
r21γ
2
1
2r2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e′1, e′2)
)
> (5)
c2(e2)− c2(e′2), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2.
2.3 Linear Compensation Schemes
The use of linear compensation schemes in hidden action models with exponential utilities and
normally distributed returns provides obvious technical convenience. However, it needs to be pointed
out that unless the linearity restriction is justified by the features of the context in which the agency
relation occurs, it is quite strong.
As far as empirical evidence is concerned Lafontaine (1992) reports that “franchise contracts
generally involve the payment, from the franchisee to the franchisor, of a lump-sum franchise fee
as well as a proportion of sales in royalties, with the latter usually constant over all sales levels.”
Furthermore, another observation is given in Slade (1996) where the author notes that only linear
contracts are used by the oil companies engaged in franchising in retail-gasoline markets in the city
of Vancouver.
On the other hand, the pioneer work displaying the optimality of linear contracts in a repeated
agency setting with exponential utilities and normally distributed returns is Holmstrom and Mil-
grom (1987). In this study, they consider a principal-agent pair involved in a repeated agency
relation to determine the drift rate of a Brownian motion governing the returns of an asset belong-
ing to the principal who is able to observe only the time-path of total returns (at any instant).8
7Please notice that in P1 we substituted γ2 using equation CC ′.
8Note that unlike it is in the discrete model, in the continuous-time setting the assumption that the principal be
able to observe only the time-path of total returns accrued until that instant (for any instant), does not imply that
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Using the specific nature of the exponential utility function due to which parties involved are im-
mune to income effects, and time-state independent cost functions, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
first establishes that the agent’s optimal responses become time-state independent. Based on that
result9, using the assumption that the principal can observe only the time path of total profits
they prove that among all possible sharing mechanisms, an optimal one is stationary and linear in
profits. Therefore, it is as if the agent were to choose the mean of a normal distribution only once
and the principal were restricted to employ linear sharing rules.
Whether or not this important result is due to the specific method of approximating the
continuous-time model via a discrete-time version has been analyzed by Hellwig and Schmidt (2002)
in which they “explicitly derive the continuous-time model as a limit of discrete-time models with
ever shorter periods and show that the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model, which is
linear in accounts, can be approximated by a sequence of optimal incentive schemes in the discrete
models”.
Under the same set of assumptions Sung (1995) considers a continuous-time version of these
models where the agent can also control the diffusion rate of the Brownian motion governing the
returns. Again, time-state independent technology and exponential utility functions imply that at
every instant the agent’s best responses are time-state independent even when he can control the
diffusion rate. The resulting problem becomes similar to that in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
with an additional time-state independent constraint (thus, features a similar stationary decision-
making environment), and he proves that the linearity in total profits result holds.
In section 4 in order to render a similar theoretical justification for our model, under the same set
of assumptions we consider a two-agent version of the model of Sung (1995), in which the two agents
can also exploit all the collusion opportunities at every instant. Borrowing the same techniques and
adding an extra assumption (to be discussed in the next paragraph) about the behavior of agents
during the collusion phase, we prove that a stationary and linear in total profits sharing rule is
optimal. Thus, it is as if the agents, who can exploit all collusion opportunities, were to choose
the mean and the variance of a normal distribution only once and the principal were restricted to
employ linear sharing rules.
The extra assumption we have to impose on the two-agent version of the model of Sung (1995)
also gives birth to a requirement needed to associate the one-shot problem P1 with the continuous-
time model. This assumption is concerned with the collusion aspect and is on the relative bargaining
he observes the instantaneous incremental return at any instant. We refer the reader to the introduction of Hellwig
and Schmidt (2002)[p.2226] for a detailed discussion of this point.
9This result immediately implies what Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) calls linearity in accounts: “If the principal
observes the outcome paths, then the intertemporal incentive problem has a stationary solution with an incentive
scheme that is a linear function of the frequencies with which the different “one-shot” outcomes are observed.”
However, to obtain linearity in total profits, which is quite different from the linearity in accounts, they note that
the assumption that the principal observes only the time-path of total profits, is critical.
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power of each agent when they try to decide which side contract to implement. Even though the
principal is still not informed of the relative bargaining power of each agent against the other, we
assume that the ratio of agents relative bargaining powers must equal to the inverse ratio of their
coefficients of risk aversion. In other words, this restriction makes an agent’s relative bargaining
power against the other be equal to the coefficient of risk aversion of his opponent.10 We need this
assumption because then, in the continuous-time model we could reduce the agents’ instantaneous
collective bargaining problem to a simple form which is suited to use techniques given in Sung
(1995). Therefore, under this particular requirement it is as if there is only one agent that the
principal faces.
Another restriction to associate the one-shot problem, P1 with the continuous-time repeated
setting described and solved in section 4 is about the cost functions. Indeed, in P1 the cost functions
are not fully tailored for the continuous-time model. To that regard we need to have agents’ cost
functions depend only on the mean and variance of output.11
Finally it needs to be said that finite effort levels are used in P1 only to keep the analysis and
numerical programming simple.
3 When Does Collusion Matter?
The following Theorem will provide a full characterization of the situations when it is sufficient
to restrict attention to optimal incentive compatible and individually rational contracts, i.e. when
collusion may be ignored.
Theorem 1 Suppose there exists a highest effort profile and that its implementation is optimal for
the principal with incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, and either of the
following holds:
A. µ(e1, e2) = µ(e1) is increasing in e1, and σ
2(e1, e2) = σ
2(e2) is decreasing in e2; or
B. µ(e1, e2) is increasing, and σ
2(e1, e2) decreasing separately in both e1 and e2.
Then incentive compatibility implies collusion proofness, hence, an optimal incentive compatible
contract is collusion proof. Moreover, for any other case not covered by the hypothesis, collusion
may make the principal strictly worse off.
10Indeed, these kinds of restrictions are generally needed in many aggregation exercises in economics. Furthermore,
we argue that such a requirement is not that restrictive. Because in the symmetric case, i.e. two agents have the
same coefficient of risk aversion, this assumption implies that they have the same relative bargaining power. And if
they have different coefficients of risk aversion, the one with the lower value would have the higher coefficient as his
relative bargaining power, which we believe has intuitive appeal.
11Recall that in P1 agents’ costs are functions of their own effort levels, and not of the mean and variance. Thus, the
cost function that would be suitable in our case should have the following form: ci(ei, e−i) = ci(µ(ei, e−i), σ2(ei, e−i)).
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As was mentioned in the introduction, an interesting feature of our model happens when the
effort choice of the first agent (the product manager) has more impact on the mean and that of
the second (the finance manager) more on the variance. This Theorem demonstrates that collusion
may be ignored, whenever either the first agent only affects the mean, whereas the second agent
only affects the variance of the return process; or they both increase the mean and decrease the
variance separately as their effort levels increase, provided that it is optimal for the principal to
induce the highest effort level with incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (e1, e2) be the highest effort profile in E
2.
Case A. With these assumptions collusion proofness constraints turns out to be
(CC1) : γ1 (µ(e1)− µ(e′1))−
r1γ
2
1
2
(
σ2(e2)− σ2(e′2)
)
>
c1(e1)− c1(e′1), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2.
(CC2) :
r1γ1
r2
(µ(e1)− µ(e′1))−
r21γ
2
1
2r2
(
σ2(e2)− σ2(e′2)
)
>
c2(e2)− c2(e′2), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2.
On the other hand, incentive compatibility constraints are:
(IC1) : γ1 (µ(e1)− µ(e′1)) > c1(e1)− c1(e′1), ∀e′1 ∈ E.
(IC2) :
−r21γ21
2r2
(
σ2(e2)− σ2(e′2)
)
> c2(e2)− c2(e′2), ∀e′2 ∈ E.
Clearly, the left hand side of (ICi) is less than the left hand side of (CCi) for i = 1, 2, which implies
that any solution satisfying (ICi) also satisfies (CCi) for i = 1, 2.
Case B. Similarly, with these assumptions,
(CC1) : γ1 (µ(e1, e2)− µ(e′1, e′2))−
r1γ
2
1
2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e′1, e′2)
)
>
c1(e1)− c1(e′1), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2.
(CC2) :
r1γ1
r2
(µ(e1, e2)− µ(e′1, e′2))−
r21γ
2
1
2r2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e′1, e′2)
)
>
c2(e2)− c2(e′2), ∀(e′1, e′2) ∈ E2.
And,
(IC1) : γ1 (µ(e1, e2)− µ(e′1, e2))−
r1γ
2
1
2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e′1, e2)
)
>
c1(e1)− c1(e′1), ∀e′1 ∈ E.
(IC2) :
r1γ1
r2
(µ(e1, e2)− µ(e1, e′2))−
r21γ
2
1
2r2
(
σ2(e1, e2)− σ2(e1, e′2)
)
>
c2(e2)− c2(e′2), ∀e′2 ∈ E.
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Again, left hand side of (ICi) is less than the left hand side of (CCi) for i = 1, 2, which implies that
any solution satisfying (ICi) also satisfies (CCi) for i = 1, 2.
This and the following two examples conclude the proof of the Theorem.
The rest of this section will display that whenever in cases not covered by the hypothesis of
Theorem 1, collusion might make the principal strictly worse off.
The following example will drop the assumption that making the agents work with the highest
effort vector is optimal for the principal. It will be shown that collusion binds, in terms of not only
risk sharing contracts, but also joint effort deviations.
In this simple nevertheless interesting example, the mean of the return depends positively only
on the effort level of agent 1, so that µ(e) = µ(e1); and the variance negatively only on the effort
level of agent 2, so that σ2(e) = σ2(e2). Assume there are two levels of effort for both agents, that is,
ei ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2. Reserve certainty equivalence figures for the agents are W1 = 1 and W2 = 1.5,
respectively. The costs are given as c1(1) = 1, c1(0) = 0 for agent 1 and c2(1) = 0.5, c2(0) = 0 for
agent 2. The coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the principal is R = 2 and those for the agents
are r1 = r2 = 10.
The mean and the variance of returns depending on the effort vector is:
(e1, e2) µ(e1) σ
2(e2)
(1, 1) 10 1
(1, 0) 10 2
(0, 1) 5 1
(0, 0) 5 2
When the principal wants to induce the highest effort level, given by e = (1, 1), his certainty
equivalent will be 4.86. Note that particularly at the highest effort profile in this problem, incentive
compatibility implies collusion proofness. However, when agents work with effort profile (1, 0),
the principal’s optimal level of certainty equivalent with incentive compatibility and individual
rationality is 4.98. Hence, the assumption of Theorem 1 that the highest effort level be optimal
for the principal to implement, does not hold. Consequently, if collusion proofness constraint is
added to the problem at effort profile (1, 0), the principal’s return decreases to 4.57. Thus, without
the collusion possibility, the most profitable effort profile for the principal is (1, 0). But, if he
considers the collusion possibility among agents, he would want them to work with effort vector
(1, 1). Hence, the highest expected return generating effort profile and compensation scheme the
principal can implement changes with by the addition of collusion proofness constraint.
In another example where each agent’s effort level exhibits the opposite effect of that of the
other, we identify a situation in which collusion matters. We display that the equivalence of incentive
compatibility and collusion proofness constraints is broken down by the agent whose control variable
is adversely affected by that of the other. In particular, if increasing agent 2’s effort decreases
the mean and increasing agent 1’s effort decreases the variance then the equivalence of incentive
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compatibility and collusion proofness given in Theorem 1 breaks down since any contract satisfying
(IC1) may not satisfy (CC1). Similarly, for the case when agent 1’s effort positively affects the
variance while agent 2’s effect is negative, but both of their controls increase the mean, then the
equivalence again does not hold because any contract satisfying (IC2) may not satisfy (CC2).
Particularly, suppose that the mean and variance of the return depend on effort levels of both
agents. However, agents effort choices affect the variables in opposite directions, i.e we assume
that agent 2’s control decreases the mean of the return, whereas agent 1’s increases the variance
of it, hence, assumption B of Theorem 1 does not hold. More specifically, the reserve certainty
equivalence figures for the agents are W1 = 0.5 and W2 = 1.5, and the effort costs c1(1) = 0.75,
c1(0) = 0 for agent 1 and c2(1) = 0.01, c2(0) = 0 for agent 2. The coefficient of absolute risk
aversion for the principal is R = 2 and that for the agents is r1 = r2 = 10, as before. The mean
and the variance of the return is summarized in the following matrix
(e1, e2) µ(e1, e2) σ
2(e1, e2)
(1, 1) 30 1
(1, 0) 31 2
(0, 1) 26.5 1/2
(0, 0) 28.3 4/3
In this example where there is no highest effort profile, making the agents work with the effort
profile (1, 1) is the most profitable for the principal both with and without collusion. The principal’s
optimal certainty equivalent figure is 26.31 with incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints. On the other hand, the same figure drops to 26.02 with the addition of collusion
proofness constraint. Note that the reason for this observation is that with collusion agents can
share each other’s risk. Therefore, the principal, in order to obtain the effort profile (1, 1), he
has to perform the costly effort of making the agents face more risk when collusion is considered.
Consequently, this intuition is confirmed in this example as well: the sharing rule coefficients are
γ1 = γ2 = 0.2641 with incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraint, and γ1 = γ2 =
0.3326 with addition of collusion proofness constraints.
4 A Continuous-Time Model with Collusion
We consider a variant of the model given by Sung (1995) in which both of the two agents employed
can control not only the mean but also variance of output, and instantaneously exploit all collusion
opportunities. In this setting we prove that among the optimal sharing rules there exists a stationary
and linear one.
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4.1 Model
The principal and agents will be interacting over the time interval t ∈ [0, 1] to determine the drift
and diffusion rates of a stochastic process governed by a Brownian motion given by
dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt,
where we think of the intermediate outcome Xt as the total returns up to period t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that µt and σ
2
t are the instantaneous mean and variance of the return at time t. We
let agents’ instantaneous time-state independent cost functions be given by ci(µt, σt), where ci :
U×S→ < and is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable. We assume ci and ciµ (derivative
with respect to mean) are bounded. And the total costs incurred by the agents are given by∫ 1
0
ci(µt, σt)dt, i = 1, 2. Agents are compensated according to the salary functions S1 and S2 that
depend on the principal’s observation of the outcome at time 1.
Before stating the problem explicitly, we have to give the technical side borrowed from Schattler
and Sung (1993) and Sung (1995): It is assumed that the probability space is given by (Ω,F , P ). Ω
be the space C = C([0, 1]) of all continuous functions on the interval [0, 1] with values in <n. The
space Ω is like a complete description of the uncertainty associated with the underlying asset. Let
Wt be the coordinate process on Ω, Wt(w) = w(t) for w ∈ Ω. w represents one possible history of
the assets over the time period and w(t) describes the correct state of the asset at time t if w occurs.
Let F0t be the filtration generated by W until time t and P be the Wiener measure on (Ω,F0t ). Ft
is defined to be augmentation of F0t by all null sets of F01 . The σ-algebra Ft contains the entire
information based on the complete history of all possible realizations up to time t and is augmented
by all null sets. Wiener measure gives an underlying probability measure. The control laws µ and
σ are Ft-predictable mappings µ : [0, 1] × Ω → U and σ : [0, 1] × Ω → S, where U is a bounded
open subset of < and S is a compact subset of <++. These control laws, µ and σ, determine the
instantaneous values of µs and σs at each date s ∈ [0, t] as functions of the history of the process X
up to time t, for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, we adopt the notation of calling the controls determined
at time t, by µt and σt, i.e. µt = µ(t,X) and σt = σ(t,X). Furthermore, we assume σ satisfies a
uniform Lipschitz condition in Z, Z¯ ∈ C[0, 1] and there exists a constant K such that
|σ(t, Z)− σ(t, Z¯)| ≤ K sup
0≤s≤t
‖Z(s)− Z¯(s)‖.
We denote Φk(U) the class of functionals φ : [0, 1] × C × U → <n which have the following
properties:
i. For (t,X) ∈ [0, 1]× C fixed, the functional φ(t,X, .) is k-times continuously differentiable on
some open neighborhood of U .
ii. For u ∈ U fixed, the process φ(., ., u) is Ft-predictable.
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iii. There exists a constant K such that
‖φ(t,X, u)‖ ≤ K(1 + max
0≤s≤t
‖Xs‖) for all (t,X, u) ∈ [0, 1]× C × U.
Define Φkb (U) as the class of functionals φ which satisfy
iii’. φ is bounded; there exists a constant K such that ‖φ(t,X, u)‖ ≤ K for all (t,X, u) ∈
[0, 1]× C × U .
4.2 The Principal’s Problem
Now we are ready to state the principal’s problem.
Definition 1 Principal chooses salary functions Sˆ1 and Sˆ2, and control laws (µˆ, σˆ), where the
salary functions depend on X1 (which is the final outcome) to maximize E[− exp{−R(X1−Sˆ1(X1)−
Sˆ2(X1))}] subject to
(i) (Feasibility) For all t ∈ [0, 1]
dXt = µˆtdt+ σˆtdBt,
(ii) (Collusion) Salary functions (Sˆ1, Sˆ2), and control laws (µˆ, σˆ) must be such that ((Sˆ1, Sˆ2), (µˆ, σˆ))
maximizes
E
[
−
(
exp
{
−r1(S1 −
∫ 1
0
c1(µt, σt)dt)
})θ (
exp
{
−r2(S2 −
∫ 1
0
c2(µt, σt)dt)
})(1−θ)]
(6)
subject to
dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt, (7)
S1 + S2 ≤ Sˆ1 + Sˆ2, (8)
− exp
{
−ri(Si −
∫ 1
0
ci(µt, σt)dt)
}
≥ − exp
{
−ri(Sˆi −
∫ 1
0
ci(µˆt, σˆt)dt)
}
, (9)
for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) (Individual rationality) For all i = 1, 2,
E
[
− exp
{
−ri(Sˆi −
∫ 1
0
ci(µˆt, σˆt)dt)
}]
≥ − exp{riWi}
13
The feasibility and individual rationality requirement in the above definition is standard. On
the other hand, the collusion requirement needs more explanation.
The collusion constraint tells us that principal’s choices must be such that no matter what
relative bargaining powers of agents are, the bargaining power weighted expected utility figure12,
equation 6, must be maximized particularly at the values the principal desires, even when agents may
use different and feasible control laws (equation 7) and different resource feasible side contracting
schemes (equation 8) which are required to be participatory13 (equation 9). For more details on
this aspect we refer the reader to our section on collusion, i.e. section 2.1.
4.3 Optimality of Linear Contracts
First we need to borrow the following assumption needed from Schattler and Sung (1993):
Assumption 1 (A1.) The diffusion rate σ : [0, 1]× C → <n×n is locally bounded, Ft-predictable,
and non-singular matrix-valued functional which satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition in Z ∈ C,
i.e., there exists a constant K such that
|σij(t, Z)− σij(t, Z¯)| ≤ K sup
0≤s≤t
‖Z(s)− Z¯(s)‖.
Assumption 2 (A2.) σ−1f ∈ Φ(U), a ∈ Φb(U) (and a takes values in <) and b ∈ Φb(U).
Assumption 3 (A3.) F : C → < is F1-measurable and bounded below.(It is allowed that F (X)
depends on the entire history in the agents’ problem. In the principal’s problem F (X) is usually
made to be a function of the terminal X1 alone.)
Assumption 4 (A4.) Suppose that for every (t,X, p, p0) ∈ [0, 1] × C × <n × <−, there exists an
u∗ ∈ U such that
H(t,X, p, p0, u
∗) = max
u∈U
H(t,X, p, p0, u)
where for (t,X, p, p0, u) ∈ [0, 1]× C ×<n ×<− × U , H as the Hamiltonian is defined to be
H(t,X, p, p0, u) := p
T (f(t,X, u) + σ(t,X)b(t,X, u)) + p0(a(t,X, u) +
1
2
‖b(t,X, u)‖2).
Note that this is needed when U is not compact.
12Note that due to the specific nature of exponential utility functions, the utility aggregation for colluding agents
we will use is as follows:
E
[
−|U1|θ|U2|(1−θ)
]
.
13None of the agents should get a lower expected utility figure than the level promised by the principal’s offer.
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For detailed discussions of these assumptions, we refer reader Schattler and Sung (1993).
The next assumption is needed to extend the work of Schattler and Sung (1993) to our setting:
Assumption 5 (A5.) The exogenously given relative bargaining power of each agent (that the
principal is not aware of) is given by θ = r2
r1+r2
for agent 1, and 1− θ = r1
r1+r2
for agent 2.
Please refer to the final paragraphs of section 2.3 for a discussion of assumption (A5).
The following Theorem, the main result of section 4, will establish that among the optimal
collusion proof salary functions one pair has to be stationary and linear in profits:
Theorem 2 Suppose (A1) - (A5) hold. Then an optimal collusion proof stationary contract profile
is as follows:
S1(µ
∗, σ∗) =
r2
r1 + r2
S(µ∗, σ∗)
S2(µ
∗, σ∗) =
r1
r1 + r2
S(µ∗, σ∗),
where
S(µ∗, σ∗) = W10 +W20 + c1(µ∗, σ∗) + c2(µ∗, σ∗)
+ (c1µ(µ
∗, σ∗) + c2µ(µ∗, σ∗)) (X1 −X0) + (c1µ(µ∗, σ∗) + c2µ(µ∗, σ∗))µ∗
+
r1r2
2(r1 + r2)
(c1µ(µ
∗, σ∗) + c2µ(µ∗, σ∗))
2 σ∗2.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.
Our proof entails modifications of selected theorems from Schattler and Sung (1993) and Sung
(1995) and has three steps: Step 1 turns the principal’s problem into one that is more suitable for
these techniques. Then in step 2 we will use Theorem 3.1 and modify the Representation Theorem
of Schattler and Sung (1993)14, Theorem 4.1, to come up with a representation rule for the salary
function of our two-agent hidden action model. Finally, in step 3 first this Representation Theorem
will be modified for our situation in order to make the two agents control the variance as well. Using
this construction we will prove the linearity result in the same fashion as was done in Sung (1995).
In order to follow techniques discussed above we have to work with the following problem which
is more suited for this analysis then the one given in definition 1.
Definition 2 Principal chooses salary functions S1 and S2 that depends on X1 (which is the final
outcome) to maximize E[− exp{−R(X1 − S1(X1)− S2(X1))}] subject to
14In this paper the agent is not allowed to control the diffusion rate of the Brownian motion governing the return
process. Moreover, the next two generalities are that the control variable u is assumed to be in U ⊂ <n for modeling
multi-task problems, and the salary function depends not only on X1 but also the entire process X.
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(i) (Feasibility) For all t ∈ [0, 1]
dXt = µˆtdt+ σˆtdBt,
(ii) (Collusion) Given S1 and S2, (µˆ, σˆ) is a pair of control laws to maximize
E
[
−
(
exp
{
−r1(S1 −
∫ 1
0
c1(µt, σt)dt)
})θ (
exp
{
−r2(S2 −
∫ 1
0
c2(µt, σt)dt)
})(1−θ)]
(10)
subject to
dXt = µtdt+ σtdBt,
for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) (Individual rationality) For all i = 1, 2,
E
[
− exp
{
−ri(Si −
∫ 1
0
ci(µˆt, σˆt)dt)
}]
≥ − exp{riWi}.
It should be pointed out that the primary difference between these problems (i.e. problem
given in definition 1 versus that given in definition 2) is about the collusion items involved. For
convenience, we will refer to the problem given in definition 1 as the first problem, and to the
problem given in definition 2 as the second.
We note that the set of constraints of the first problem is a subset of that of the second problem:
If (Sˆ1, Sˆ2; µˆ, σˆ) solves the first nested maximization problem (i.e. is in the constraint set of the
first problem), then clearly µˆ, σˆ) solves the second nested maximization problem at given salary
functions (Sˆ1, Sˆ2) (thus, (Sˆ1, Sˆ2; µˆ, σˆ) is in the constraint set of the second problem).
Therefore, from this point on until the very end of the proof of Theorem 2, we will work with the
second problem in which the principal is more relaxed. Indeed, the final steps to establish the proof
of Theorem 2 will be to show that the optimal solution to the second problem is in the constraint
set of the first problem.
Note that from the point of view of the principal (who does not know the relative bargaining
power of the agents) the agents solve the following maximization problem:
Eu
[
−
∣∣∣∣− exp{−r1(S1(X)− ∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u)dt)
}∣∣∣∣θ ∣∣∣∣−exp{−r2(S2(X)− ∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u)dt)
}∣∣∣∣(1−θ)
]
for all θ over all admissible controls u, subject to
dXt = f(t,X, u)dt+ σ(t,X)dBt.
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We assume that principal tries to maximize his expected utility after the salaries are paid. So his
maximization problem is
E[− exp{−R(X1 − S1(X)− S2(X))}]
for all θ ∈ [0, 1] over all salary functions S1 = S1(X) and S2 = S2(X) which guarantee the agents’
reservation utility subject to
dXt = f(t,X, u)dt+ σ(t,X)dBt,
where u is the optimal control implemented by S1 and S2.
In theorem 3.1 of Schattler and Sung (1993) they give the mathematical model for a class of
maximization problems which include both the agents’ and principal’s problems as given above.
This class of maximization problems is: maximize
E
[
− exp
{
−F (Y ) +
∫ 1
0
a(t, Y, u)dt+
∫ 1
0
bT (t, Y, u)dBt
}]
over all admissible controls u, subject to
dYt = f(t, Y, u)dt+ σ(t, Y )dBt.
Recall that the possible actions of the agents are represented by the class U of all Ft-predictable
processes u with values in some control set U , u : [0, 1] × C → U , (t,X) → u(t,X). It is assumed
that U(⊂ <m) can be written as a countable union of compact subsets. (U may be a compact set
or be any open set.)
Condition (A2) with conditions on functionals Φ enables a change of measure. The control
problem can be stated as the following with this change of measure: 15
J(u) = Eu
[
− exp
{
−F (Y ) +
∫ 1
0
a(t, Y, u)dt+
∫ 1
0
bT (t, Y, u)dBut
}]
.
The following Theorem due to Schattler and Sung (1993) gives the main results of Martingale
approach to stochastic control problems adjusted for exponential utility functions. Note that as
they have done the symbol ∇ denotes the row vector.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 3.1 of Schattler and Sung (1993)) Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), the
stochastic control problem to maximize
J(u) = Eu
[
− exp
{
−F (Y ) +
∫ 1
0
a(t, Y, u)dt+
∫ 1
0
bT (t, Y, u)dBut
}]
15For the details of this nontrivial yet standard step, the reader is referred to Schattler and Sung (1993).
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over all u ∈ U has a solution. Furthermore, there exist Ft-adapted processes Vt and ∇Vt such that
u∗ ∈ U , ∫ 1
0
|∇Vtσ|2dt <∞ a.e, such that u∗ ∈ U is optimal if and only if
u∗ ∈ argmax
u
{
∇Vt × (f(t,X, u) + σ(t,X)b(t,X, u)) + Vt ×
(
a(t,X, u) +
1
2
‖b(t,X, u)‖2
)}
for almost all (t, w) ∈ [0, 1] × Ω. Furthermore, the value process Vt has an Itoˆ differential of the
form
Vt = V0 −
∫ t
0
∇Vt (f(t,X, u∗) + σ(t,X)b(t,X, u∗)) + Vt
(
a(t,X, u∗) +
1
2
‖b(t,X, u∗)‖2
)
dt
+
∫ t
0
∇VtdXt.
In order to apply Theorem 3 to our principal-agent problem we have to convert our control
problems into the following format:
J(u) = Eu
[
− exp
{
−F (Y ) +
∫ 1
0
a(t, Y, u)dt+
∫ 1
0
bT (t, Y, u)dBut
}]
over all u ∈ U (recall that here u stands for the control variable and not the utility).
We first consider the problem of maximizing J(u) defined by
Eu
[
−
∣∣∣∣− exp{−r1(S1(X)− ∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u)dt
)}∣∣∣∣θ ∣∣∣∣− exp{−r2(S2(X)− ∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u)dt
)}∣∣∣∣(1−θ)
]
over all u ∈ U . Note that this problem captures the bargaining between the two agents the first
having a weight of θ ∈ [0, 1], and the second 1 − θ. As usual we will be considering sharing rules
Si : C → < of the following structure:
Si(X) = Si1(X) +
∫ 1
0
αi(t,X)dt+
∫ 1
0
βTi (t,X)dXt.
As in Schattler and Sung (1993) we make the following assumptions: Si : C → <, i = 1, 2, is
and F1-measurable which is bounded below and αi, βi, i = 1, 2 are all Ft predictable, αi is bounded
and βi obeys β
T
i f ∈ Φb(U), and βiσ is bounded. We let Σ be the class of all F1-measurable random
variables which can be written as described above.
The following Theorem and its corollary, in which we deal with the agents’ problem, is our
version of Theorem 4.1 from Schattler and Sung (1993).
Theorem 4 Let σ−1f ∈ Φ(U); ci ∈ Φb(U), i = 1, 2; and suppose S1, S2 ∈ Σ. If condition (A4)
holds, then the problem to maximize is J(u) defined by
Eu
[
−
∣∣∣∣− exp{−r1(S1(X)− ∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u)dt
)}∣∣∣∣θ ∣∣∣∣−exp{−r2(S2(X)− ∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u)dt
)}∣∣∣∣(1−θ)
]
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over all u ∈ U has a solution for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. There exist Ft-adapted processes Vθt and ∇ˆVθt such
that u∗ ∈ U is an optimal control if and only if u∗ maximizes
∇ˆVθt f(t,X, u) + Vθt (r1θc1(t,X, u) + r2(1− θ)c2(t,X, u))
over U for almost every t ∈ [0, 1], w ∈ Ω. Furthermore, if u∗ is an optimal control, then
S1(X) + S2(X) =
r1 + r2
r2
θW10 +
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)W20 + r1 + r2
r2
θ
∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u
∗)dt
+
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)
∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u
∗)dt− r1 + r2
r1r2
∫ 1
0
∇ˆVθt σ(t,X)
Vθt
dBu
∗
t
+
1
2
r1 + r2
r1r2
∫ 1
0
‖ ∇ˆVθt σ(t,X) ‖2
Vθ2t
dt,
where the constants W10 and W20 are the agents’ certainty equivalent at time 0.
Proof. The following proof is a revised version of the proof of Theorem 4.1 from Schattler and
Sung (1993).
J(u) = Eu[− exp{−r1θ(S1(X)−
∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u)dt)− r2(1− θ)(S2(X)−
∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u)dt)}].
Since S1, S2 ∈ Σ,
J(u) = Eu[− exp{−r1θ(S11(X) +
∫ 1
0
α1(t,X)dt+
∫ 1
0
βT1 (t,X)dXt −
∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u)dt)
−r2(1− θ)(S21(X) +
∫ 1
0
α2(t,X)dt+
∫ 1
0
βT2 (t,X)dXt −
∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u)dt)}].
Since dXt = f(t,X, u)dt+ σ(t,X)dB
u
t , the utility becomes
J(u) = Eu[− exp{−r1θS11(X)− r2(1− θ)S21(X)
+
∫ 1
0
[r1θ(c1(t,X, u)− α1(t,X)− βT1 (t,X)f(t,X, u))
+ r2(1− θ)(c2(t,X, u)− α2(t,X)− βT2 (t,X)f(t,X, u))]dt
−
∫ 1
0
(
r1θβ
T
1 (t,X) + r2(1− θ)βT2 (t,X)
)
σ(t,X)dBut }].
By Theorem 3 the stochastic control problem has a solution and there exist Ft-adapted processes
Vθt and ∇Vθt such that u∗ ∈ U is an optimal control if and only if u∗ maximizes
∇Vθt × {f(t,X, u) + σ(t,X)σT (t,X)(r1θβT1 (t,X) + r2(1− θ)βT2 (t,X))}
+Vθt × {r1θ(c1(t,X, u)− α1(t,X)− βT1 (t,X)f(t,X, u))
+ r2(1− θ)(c2(t,X, u)− α2(t,X)− βT2 (t,X)f(t,X, u))
+
1
2
‖σT (t,X)(r1θβ1(t,X) + r2(1− θ)β2(t,X))‖2}
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over the control set. If we define a new Ft-adapted process ∇ˆVθt by
∇ˆVθt := ∇Vθt − Vθt (r1θβT1 (t,X) + r2(1− θ)βT2 (t,X)),
then the control dependent part of the function H is of the form
∇ˆVθt .f(t,X, u) + Vθt .(r1θc1(t,X, u) + r2(1− θ)c2(t,X, u)),
so u∗ maximizes the previous expressing over U for almost every t ∈ [0, 1], w ∈ Ω.
To derive the representation for salary function, we define the agents’ certainty equivalent wealth
processes as follows:
W θ1t = −
r22
r1(r1 + r2)2
1
θ2
ln(−Vθt ),
W θ2t = −
r21
r2(r1 + r2)2
1
(1− θ)2 ln(−V
θ
t ).
So,
W θt =
(
(r1 + r2)
2θ2
r22
W1t +
(r1 + r2)
2(1− θ)2
r21
W2t
)
= −K ln(−Vθt ),
where K ≡
(
1
r1
+ 1
r2
)
, then By Itoˆ’s rule
dW θt = −(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)
1
Vθt
dVθt +
1
2
‖∇Vθt σ(t,X)‖2
(Vθt )2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)dt.
By Theorem 3 Vθt has an Itoˆ differential of the form
Vθt = Vθo +
∫ t
0
{∇Vθt .
(
f(t,X, u) + σ(t,X)σT (t,X)(r1θβ
T
1 (t,X) + r2(1− θ)βT2 (t,X))
)
+ Vθt .(r1θ(c1(t,X, u)− α1(t,X)− βT1 (t,X)f(t,X, u))
+ r2(1− θ)(c2(t,X, u)− α2(t,X)− βT2 (t,X)f(t,X, u))
+
1
2
‖σT (t,X)(r1θβ1(t,X) + r2(1− θ)β2(t,X))‖2)}dt+
∫ t
0
∇Vθt dXt.
So,
dW θt = −(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)βT1 dXt
+(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)
1
Vθt
{∇Vθt
(
f(t,X, u)− σ(t,X)σT (t,X)(r1θβ1(t,X) + r2(1− θ)β2(t,X))
)
+ Vθt (r1θ(c1(t,X, u)− α1(t,X)− βT1 (t,X)f(t,X, u)) + r2(1− θ)(c2(t,X, u)
− α2(t,X)− βT2 (t,X)f(t,X, u)) +
1
2
‖σT (t,X)(r1θβ1(t,X)
+ r2(1− θ)β2(t,X))‖2)}dt
+
1
2
‖∇Vθt σ(t,X)‖2
(Vθt )2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)dt.
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Since K =
(
1
r1
+ 1
r2
)
, then
dW θt = {Kr1θc1(t,X, u) +Kr2(1− θ)c2(t,X, u)}dt
−{Kr1θα1(t,X) +Kr2(1− θ)α2(t,X)}dt+ {Kr1θβT1 +Kr2(1− θ)βT2 }dXt
−K ∇ˆV
θ
t
Vθt
σ(t,X)dBu
∗
t +
K
2
‖∇ˆVθt σ(t,X)‖2
(Vθt )2
dt.
When we integrate between 0 and 1, the result follows.
Corollary 1 Suppose m = n and assume that the matrix Duf(t,X, u) is invertible for all (t,X, u) ∈
[0, 1]× Ω× U . If an optimal control u∗ for the agents’ problem (given in definition 2) takes values
in the interior of U , then the following representation of the sharing function S1 + S2 in terms of
the optimal control u∗ is: S1(X) + S2(X) equals
r1 + r2
r2
θW10 +
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)W20
+
r1 + r2
r2
θ
∫ 1
0
c1(t,X, u
∗)dt+
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)
∫ 1
0
c2(t,X, u
∗)dt
−r1 + r2
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θ∇uc1(t,X, u∗) + r2(1− θ)∇uc2(t,X, u∗))D−1u f(t,X, u¯)σ(t,X)dBu
∗
t
+
1
2
r1 + r2
r1r2
∫ 1
0
‖(r1θ∇uc1(t,X, u∗) + r2(1− θ)∇uc2(t,X, u∗))D−1u f(t,X, u¯)σ(t,X)‖2dt.
Proof. Since u∗ maximizes ∇ˆVθt f(t,X, u) + Vθt (r1θc1(t,X, u) + r2(1− θ)c2(t,X, u)),
∇ˆVθtDuf(t,X, u) + Vθt (r1θ∇uc1(t,X, u) + r2(1− θ)∇uc2(t,X, u)) = 0.
Then,
∇ˆVθt
Vθt
= −(r1θ∇uc1(t,X, u) + r2(1− θ)∇uc2(t,X, u))D−1u f(t,X, u).
The result follows by plugging this to the representation of the sharing function S1 + S2.
It is imperative to deal with controls which the principal can enforce in the problem given in
definition 2. If there are controls u¯ for which the representation theorem holds, but which are not
optimal in the agents’ problem (given in definition 2) for the associated sharing function S¯1 + S¯2,
then the principal cannot make the agents follow u¯ by assigning S¯1 + S¯2.
Definition 3 A control u is ”implementable” if the sharing function S¯1 + S¯2 = S¯1(u) + S¯2(u) in
the representation theorem with control u is assigned to the agents as salary function and u comes
as an optimal control for the agents’ problem (given in definition 2) with S¯1(u) + S¯2(u).
21
Now we are set to go into step 2. Note that in step 1, the class of admissible salary rules
was narrowed down to the above given form. The next step will be to adopt this Representation
Theorem to the problem given in definition 2, where agents choose (µ, σ) = ({µt, σt}t) as their
control laws, and then characterize the implementable ones.
First we have another corollary to Theorem 4:
Corollary 2 Suppose that given an arbitrary admissible salary function S1, S2, the agents optimal
control law (to be obtained from the problem given in definition 2) is (µˆ, σˆ), where µˆt, t ∈ [0, 1]
almost everywhere lies in the interior of U , and that the resulting agents’ expected utility satisfies
the participation constraints. Then the salary function can be represented as the following:
S1(µˆ, σˆ) + S2(µˆ, σˆ) =
r1 + r2
r2
θW10 +
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)W20 (11)
+
∫ 1
0
[
r1 + r2
r2
θc1(µˆt, σˆt) +
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)c2(µˆt, σˆt)
]
dt
+
∫ 1
0
[
r1 + r2
r2
θc1µ(µˆt, σˆt) +
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)c2µ(µˆt, σˆt)
]
dXt
−
∫ 1
0
[
r1 + r2
r2
θc1µ(µˆt, σˆt) +
r1 + r2
r1
(1− θ)c2µ(µˆt, σˆt)
]
µˆtdt
+
1
2
r1 + r2
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θc1µ(µˆt, σˆt) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µˆt, σˆt))2 σˆ2t dt.
Proof. From Theorem 4, we see that for any admissible diffusion-rate processes σt, if µˆt is
optimal, then the salary function can be written as S1(µˆ, σ) + S2(µˆ, σ). Suppose that (µˆt, σˆt) is an
optimal control pair for the agents’ problem (given in definition 2). This means that given any σˆt,
the optimal drift rate is µˆt. Hence, the salary function can be represented as S1(µˆ, σˆ)+S2(µˆ, σˆ).
This representation is only a necessary condition for an admissible salary function S1, S2 to be an
optimal salary function. But the representation does not consider the agents’ first order condition
with respect to σ. Moreover, the representation is F1-measurable, i.e, depends on the entire history.
However, in the problem given in definition 2, principal can only implement X1-measurable salary
rule. Because of these two reasons, the representation gives a too large class of salary functions.
Thus, we have to further narrow it down. This leads to the following Theorem, which is a modified
version of proposition A1 of Sung (1995).
Theorem 5 If for almost all t ∈ [0, 1], (µ¯t, σ¯t) ∈ U × S, where U is a bounded open subset of <
and S is a compact subset of <++, maximizes Φa(µt, σt; µ¯t, σ¯t) defined by
Φa(µt, σt; µ¯t, σ¯t) =
r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t))µt
− r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1(µt, σt) + r2(1− θ)c2(µt, σt))
− 1
2
r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t))2 σ2t ,
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then (µ¯, σ¯) is implementable. Furthermore, converse holds if assumption 5 is satisfied (i.e. θ = r2
r1+r2
and (1− θ) = r1
r1+r2
).
Proof. The agents’ problem given a salary function as defined in equation 11 is to choose
Ft-predictable control laws, {µt, σt}t, in order to maximize
E
[
−
∣∣∣∣− exp{−r1(S¯1(µ¯t, σ¯t)− ∫ 1
0
c1(µt, σt)dt)
}∣∣∣∣θ ∣∣∣∣−exp{−r2(S¯2(µ¯t, σ¯t)− ∫ 1
0
c2(µt, σt)dt)
}∣∣∣∣(1−θ)
]
.
Recall that K ≡ r1+r2
r1r2
, and additionally doing the required substitutions on the above term renders
E{− exp{− 1
K
[
(r1 + r2)
2
r22
θ2W10 +
(r1 + r2)
2
r21
(1− θ)2W20 (12)
(r1 + r2)
2
r22
θ2
∫ 1
0
c1(µ¯t, σ¯t)dt+
(r1 + r2)
2
r21
(1− θ)2
∫ 1
0
c2(µ¯t, σ¯t)dt
+
(r1 + r2)
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t))µtdt
− (r1 + r2)
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t)) µ¯tdt
+
1
2
(r1 + r2)
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t))2 σ¯2t dt
− (r1 + r2)
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θc1(µt, σt) + r2(1− θ)c2(µt, σt)) dt
+
(r1 + r2)
r1r2
∫ 1
0
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t)) σtdBt]}}.
Consequently by Lemma A1 of Sung (1995) the agents’ dynamic programming equation takes
the following form: 16
0 ≡ ∂V
∂t
(t,X) + max
µt,σt
{ ∂V
∂Xt
(t,X)[µt − θ2 (r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t))] (13)
+
σ2t
2
∂2V
∂X2t
(t,X) +
1
K
(
r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1(µt, σt) + r2(1− θ)c2(µt, σt))
+
r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t)) µ¯t
− r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t))µt
− (r1 + r2)
2
r22
θ2c1(µ¯t, σ¯t)− (r1 + r2)
2
r21
(1− θ)2c2(µ¯t, σ¯t)
− 1
2
r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t)) σ¯2t
+
1
2
r1 + r2
r1r2
(r1θc1µ(µ¯t, σ¯t) + r2(1− θ)c2µ(µ¯t, σ¯t)) σ2t )V (t,Xt)}.
16Note that V (t,Xt) defined by V (t,Xt) ≡ sup{µt,σt}t J({µt, σt}t; t,X) depends on the current state Xt rather
than the whole past given by Xt ≡ {Xt′ : t′ ∈ [0, t]}.
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with the the terminal condition
V (1, X) = − exp
{
− 1
K
[
(r1 + r2)
2
r22
θ2W10 +
(r1 + r2)
2
r21
(1− θ)2W20
]}
.
If {µ¯t, σ¯t}t maximizes Φa for all most all t ∈ [0, 1] and defining V (t,X) = − exp{− 1K [ (r1+r2)
2
r22
θ2W10+
(r1+r2)2
r21
(1 − θ)2W20]}, then it satisfies the dynamic programming equation with {µ¯t, σ¯t}t. As was
done in Sung (1995), then by the verification theorem of the dynamic equation in Schattler and
Sung (1993), {µ¯t, σ¯t}t is the optimal control pair where V (t,X) as given above is the value function.
Now for the converse, we need the additional assumption that θ = r2
r1+r2
. Suppose that {µ¯s, σ¯s}
is implementable for all s ∈ [t, 1]. Then by substituting for θ into equation 12 we get that the
agents’ optimal remaining expected utility at time t is
− exp{− 1
K
[W10 +W20]} ×
E[exp{−1
2
∫ 1
t
(
− 1
K
(c1µ(µ¯s, σ¯s) + c2µ(µ¯s, σ¯s))
)2
σ¯2sds
+
∫ 1
t
(
− 1
K
(c1µ(µ¯s, σ¯s) + c2µ(µ¯s, σ¯s))
)
σ¯s}dBs].
The second term is the expectation of a Girsanov density, which is 1. Hence, if {µ¯s, σ¯s}s is im-
plementable and θ = r2
r1+r2
, the agents’ optimal remaining expected utility at time t is V (t,X) =
− exp{− 1
K
[W10 + W20]}. Since − exp{− 1K [W10 + W20]} meets all assumption in Lemma A1 of
Sung (1995), the agents’ optimal remaining expected utility satisfies equation 13, which implies
{µ¯s, σ¯s}s ∈ argmax(µs,σs)Φa(µs, σs; µ¯s, σ¯s) for almost all s ∈ [t, 1]. As the choice of t is arbitrary,
this holds for s ∈ [0, 1]
Let us now define a set of controls that can induce the agents to choose the controls implied by
the salary function given in the form of the representation as done in Sung (1995):
Z ≡ {{(µ¯t, σ¯t)}|t ∈ [0, 1], {µ¯t, σ¯t}t ∈ argmax(µt,σt)Φa(µt, σt; µ¯t, σ¯t)} .
But, note that not every implementable control is in that set.(In the case of θ = r2
r1+r2
, then every
implementable control should be in Z.) Z is still a large class of controls from the point of view
of the principal since the set contains controls that are not necessarily X1-measurable. We have to
take into account that:
Z′ = Z ∩ {S1({µ¯t, σ¯t}) + S2({µ¯t, σ¯t}) as in equation 11 and is X1-measurable}
Set Z′ gives the complete description of the implementable contracts (when θ = r2
r1+r2
). Now, we
are ready to deal with the principal’s problem given in definition 2.
E[− exp{−R(X1 −W10 −W20 −
∫ 1
0
(c1(µˆt, σˆt) + c2(µˆt, σˆt))dt−
∫ 1
0
(c1µ(µˆt, σˆt) + c2µ(µˆt, σˆt))σˆt)dBt
− 1
2K
∫ 1
0
(c1µ(µˆt, σˆt) + c2µ(µˆt, σˆt))
2σˆ2t )dt}].
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As was done in Sung (1995) it is enough to consider stationary solutions to this problem by
letting principal choose ({µˆt, σˆ}t) ∈ Z, such that (µˆt, σˆt) = (µˆ, σˆ) for almost all the t ∈ [0, 1].
Indeed, following the same steps we identify the optimal salary functions with stationary controls
and observe that they are linear. Moreover, employing the same techniques it can be shown that
these optimal salary functions, identified by using equation 11, are also a solution to the principal’s
problem (given in definition 2) where the controls are chosen from Z′.
S(µ∗, σ∗) = S1(µ∗, σ∗) + S2(µ∗, σ∗)
= W10 +W20 + c1(µ
∗, σ∗) + c2(µ∗, σ∗)
+ (c1µ(µ
∗, σ∗) + c2µ(µ∗, σ∗)) (X1 −X0) + (c1µ(µ∗, σ∗) + c2µ(µ∗, σ∗))µ∗
+
r1r2
2(r1 + r2)
(c1µ(µ
∗, σ∗) + c2µ(µ∗, σ∗))
2 σ∗2.
Observing S1(µ
∗, σ∗) = r2
r1+r2
S(µ∗, σ∗) and S2(µ∗, σ∗) = r1r1+r2S(µ
∗, σ∗) leads us to the final step
where we have to show that these salary functions and control laws are a member of the constraint
set of the problem given in definition 1.
We have to point out that for the solution to the problem given in definition 2 (that we will
refer to as the second problem), clearly feasibility (item i) and individual rationality (item iii)
requirements of the problem given in definition 1 (that we call the first problem) are satisfied. So
the remaining part is to show that the collusion requirement of the first problem (item ii which we
may refer to as the first nested maximization problem) is also satisfied. In other words we have to
establish that (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ;µ
∗, σ∗) solves the first nested maximization problem where (µ∗, σ∗) derived
as the optimal control laws to the second nested maximization problem at values (S∗1 , S
∗
2).
Here we present the intuitive argument to establish this relation which easily can be verified
by checking the first order conditions of the first nested maximization problem. Because that
there are no income effects with exponential utility functions, and (µ∗, σ∗) solves the second nested
maximization problem at salary functions (S∗1 , S
∗
2) derived above, agents do not possess any joint
deviation opportunities in terms of control laws when salary functions (S∗1 , S
∗
2) is offered. Second,
since the ratio of the salary functions
S∗1
S∗2
is equal to r2
r1
in every contingencies, the agents cannot share
risk more efficiently by deviating to resource feasible and participatory side contracting scheme.
Thus, (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ;µ
∗, σ∗) solves the first nested maximization problem, therefore, (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ;µ
∗, σ∗) is in
the constraint set of the first problem. Since the constraint set of the first problem is a subset of the
constraint set of the second17, and (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ;µ
∗, σ∗) solves the second problem, (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ;µ
∗, σ∗) also is
a solution to the first problem. This finishes the proof of Theorem 2.
17Please refer to the discussion in the second paragraph right after definition 2.
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